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The detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in commercial cargoes is a major objective in the
field of nuclear security. In this work we investigate the use of two-neutron time-correlations from
photo-fission using the Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF) detectors in Passport Systems
Inc.’s (PSI) Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution (SNAR) platform for the purpose of detecting ∼5 kg
quantities of fissionable materials in seconds. The goal of this effort was to extend the secondary
scan mode of this system to differentiate fissile materials, such as highly enriched uranium, from
fissionable materials, such as low enriched and depleted uranium (LEU and DU). Experiments were
performed using a variety of material samples, and data were analyzed using the variance-over-mean
technique referred to as Y2F or Feynman-α. Results were compared to computational models to
improve our ability to predict system performance for distinguishing fissile materials. Simulations
were then combined with empirical formulas to generate receiver operating characteristics (ROC)
curves for a variety of shielding scenarios. We show that a 10 second screening with a 200 µA 9 MeV
X-ray beam is sufficient to differentiate kilogram quantities of HEU from DU in various shielding
scenarios in a standard cargo container.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Fissile materials refer to materials which, due to their nuclear structure, allow for sustained fission chains. The two
most common isotopes which form the basis of fissile materials are 235U and 239Pu. Methods for detecting the presence
of fissile materials support the goals of national and international programs for nuclear-nonproliferation. An extensive
literature exists on potential identification schemes using active interrogation including neutron probes and delayed
and prompt neutron signals [1–5], photon probes and delayed neutron signals [6–12], photon and neutron probes and
delayed neutron signals [13–15], and photon probes and fission product radiation [16, 17]. A general review of the
various concepts can be found in Ref. [18]. All of these methods use single-particle signals. Multi-particle schemes,
usually two- and three-neutron signals have also been pursued, with photon [19, 20] and neutron [21–25] beams as
well as in passive interrogation [26–32], where ambient radiations are used to induce the signals. Here we report on an
active interrogation method using 9 MeV Bremsstrahlung photons to induce the emission of time-correlated, prompt
neutrons measured within the Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF) system developed at Passport Systems
Inc. (PSI) [33–35].
II. TIME-CORRELATION OF FISSION-CHAIN NEUTRONS
A fission chain reaction occurs in fissile material when the neutrons from each fission diffuse through the material
and induce subsequent fissions in other nuclei. The neutrons emitted from this process are highly correlated, resulting
in neutron count distributions that deviate significantly from Poisson distributions produced by random neutron
events.
The theory of fission-chain correlations was initially developed by Richard Feynman while at Los Alamos [36]. The
aim of that research was to describe the neutron fluctuations in a reactor pile where the measured neutrons originate
from fission chains and random decays. To measure deviations from the Poisson expectation, Feynman defined a
normalized second moment,
Y2F =
〈n2〉 − 〈n〉2 − 〈n〉
2〈n〉 ≡
variance−mean
2 ∗mean (1)
where n is the measured neutron count per unit time, and 〈n〉 and 〈n2〉 represent averages over a series of time-gates.
Subtracting the mean from the variance enforces Y2F = 0 for the special case of a Poisson distribution, and division
by the mean ensures that the quantity is independent of rate. The subscript “2F”, not used in the original paper, has
been added by others to credit Feynman and to denote that this quantity is derived from the second moment.
This statistic has been used extensively in the study of nuclear reactor cores [37–41], and it has been extended
for time varying sources of the fluctuations, e.g. in accelerator driven cores [42–48]. In these systems the number of
neutrons generated spontaneously from radioactive decay greatly exceeds those generated by the introduced beam.
The idea for using the time-correlation for non-destructive inspection of objects containing fissile material has been
pursued for “passive” interrogation schemes [21, 22, 24, 26–30, 49–52] (where the natural background initiates the
fission chains) and for “active” interrogation schemes [19, 20, 23, 25, 53] (where a beam of particles induces the fission
chains).
For neutron-induced fission-chains from an idealized point source, a time-dependent expression for Y2F has been
developed by Snyderman and Prasad [54–56],
Y2F =
(
1− 1− e
−λT
λT
)

[
1 +
(M − 1)(ν − 1)
ν
]
ν2
ν
(M − 1). (2)
where,
λ = inverse of the neutron correlation time, a convolution of fission-chain and neutron transit times,
T = time-gate during which neutrons are counted,
 = neutron detection efficiency,
M = neutron multiplication, 11−k , where k = pν is k-effective and p is the neutron-induced fission probability,
ν = the first moment, equal to the mean number for the neutron distribution from a single induced fission,
ν2 = the second combinatorial moment, half the variance for the neutron distribution from a single fission.
Eq. 2 illustrates utility of Y2F , whcih increases with the square of the multiplication and is therefore sensitive to
the enrichment if the geometry of the object and efficiency of the detector are known. One can construct higher order
moments (i.e. Y3F,4F ) that depend on higher orders of the multiplication, but a corresponding dependence on higher
orders of the efficiency makes these statistics more suitable for large acceptance detectors and/or long integration
3times due to the reduced coincidence rates. It is also important to note that Eq. 2 is appropriate for neutron beams.
In Sec. V we will modify this expression for photon-induced fission-chains in extended objects.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To study the feasibility of using photo-induced fissions chains to identify and characterize fissile materials we use a
subset of the components of the PSI SNAR platform. The photon beam is generated from electron bremsstrahlung
on a water-cooled radiator. The electron current is adjustable and uniform with high duty-cycle. For all experiments
a 9 MeV electron kinetic energy was used. The beam currents are adjustable from 100 to 500 µAmps. For the results
presented here, the beam current was set to 200 µAmps to avoid the non-Poisson effects of the data acquisition (DAQ)
dead time losses. This corresponds to a rate of 2× 1012 Hz for photons with energies between 2 and 9 MeV, incident
on an approximately 10 × 10 cm square spot size at the target location. The photon beam energy spectrum for the
9 MeV Bremsstrahlung radiator is shown in Fig. 1.
 [MeV]γE
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dN
/d
E 
[co
un
ts 
/ 1
0k
eV
]
-510
-410
-310
FIG. 1. Photon energy spectrum in PSI’s SNAR system, calculated with a GEANT4 simulation.
The full SNAR configuration is shown in Fig. 2. The PNPF detectors consist of EJ-309 5 inch diameter liquid
scintillator detectors coupled to 5” Hamamatsu photomutilpier tubes arranged in two sets of 2 × 8 arrays placed on
opposite sides of the cargo container. The PNPF arrays have ∼5 cm thick high density polyethylene (HDPE) inserts
placed in between the detectors to reduce adjacent detector cross-talk that can lead to an artificial Y2F signal. Before
and after tests show that these inserts reduce the cross-talk component by a factor of four.
Measurements of Y2F were made for a set of objects designed to study the relationship between Y2F and neutron
multiplication. These objects, listed in Table 1, were constructed from discs of depleted uranium (DU) and highly
enriched uranium (HEU), and blocks of low enriched uranium (LEU). The objects were arranged in geometries to
achieve a higher range of multiplication values. Fig. 3 shows the stacking arrangement for the three HEU discs. The
highest multiplication values were achieved with an interleaved stack of LEU and HEU with HDPE moderators placed
above and below the stack to provide neutron reflection. Multiplication values were calculated using MCNP 6.2 [57]
run in the kcode mode. The control benchmark was obtained with a beryllium block, in order to generate a large
quantity of uncorrelated photo-neutrons anticipated to have no measurable Y2F value. Data were collected from a
series of 600-second exposures, which were then combined for each object during the data analysis. Approximately
ten exposures were collected for each uranium configuration, with additional exposures taken for the beryllium object.
4Material Dimension Mass Mult. Run Duration
Be block 7.3 x 7.3 x 10.4 cm 0.988 kg 1.000 8360 s
DU 1-disc 0.2 x 5 cm 0.3 kg 1.015 6690 s
DU 2-disc 0.4 x 5 cm 0.6 kg 1.026 6750 s
DU 3-disc 0.6 x 5 cm 0.9 kg 1.035 7080 s
HEU 1-disc 0.2 x 5 cm 0.3 kg 1.061 7080 s
HEU 2-disc 0.4 x 5 cm 0.6 kg 1.109 7080 s
HEU 3-disc 0.6 x 5 cm 0.9 kg 1.155 6960 s
HEU+LEU 0.2 x 5 cm
1-stack 10 x 10 x 2 cm 3.988 kg 1.177 6410 s
HEU+LEU 2 (0.2 x 5 cm)
2-stack 2 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 7.976 kg 1.304 7240 s
HEU+LEU 3 (0.2 x 5 cm)
3-stack 3 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 11.964 kg 1.401 6920 s
HEU+LEU 3 (0.2 x 5 cm)
3-stack 3 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 11.964 kg 1.430 7080 s
+HDPE 10 x 10 x 1.27 cm
HEU+LEU 3 (0.2 x 5 cm)
3-stack 3 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 11.964 kg 1.468 6760 s
+HDPE 10 x 10 x 2.54 cm
HEU+LEU 3 (0.2 x 5 cm)
3-stack 3 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 11.964 kg 1.501 5980 s
+HDPE 10 x 10 x 3.81 cm
HEU+LEU 3 (0.2 x 5 cm)
3-stack 3 (10 x 10 x 2 cm) 11.964 kg 1.527 7080 s
+HDPE 10 x 10 x 5.08 cm
TABLE 1. List of objects exposed to the 9 MeV Bremsstrahlung beam within the Passport Systems SNAR facility.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Neutron Identification
The main component of the detection system consists of an array of EJ-309 scintillators, coupled to Hamamatsu
photomultiplier tubes (PMT). The choice of the PMTs was based on their < 3 ns rise time, thus retaining the
sensitivity to the difference between the two main fast components of the light production from the triplet-triplet
annihilation. The increase in triplet-triplet annihilation from the much larger ionization density of the neutron-
recoiled proton tracks results in a distinct delay in light output. Neutrons can be distinguished from photons by
their relative fractions of fast and slow light output using various Pulse Shape Descrimination (PSD) techniques, and
their deposited energies can be quantified. The left panel of Fig. 4 shows a histogram of PSD vs. deposited energy,
in electron equivalents, for a set of detector events. The distribution is then split into individual energy bins, and
the PSD distribution for every energy bin is fitted with two Gaussians, as can be seen in the right panel of Fig. 4,
which shows the 2D cut used to separate neutrons from photons. However, this is not sufficient to suppress the very
large photon population, created by the intense 200 µA photon beam. Therefore, more sophisticated pulse shape
discrimination algorithms were developed to reject the photon pileups, which otherwise would contribute a significant
background to the neutron population [35]. Overall, the combined pulse shape analysis allows a suppression of the
photon population by a factor of ×107, limiting the beam-on background count to only the cosmogenic neutrons.
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Figure 1. Passport’s SNAR cargo scanner. FIG. 2. Configuration for Passport Systems Inc Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution (SNAR) platform. This analysis uses the
photofission detectors shown on the sides.
FIG. 3. Sample object position for SNAR system data collection.
B. Multiplicity analysis of neutron events
The experimental data were collected in a series of 600-second exposures, with some exposures ending prematurely
due to disruptions within the data acquisition system due to the extended run times and need for data synchronization.
The identified neutrons in each run were arranged in time-ordered sequence to facilitate binning in time-gates of varying
duration. For clarity, we rewrite Eq. 1 above with explicit averages, where sums are taken over sequential time-gates,
n refers to the bin-number corresponding to the neutrons detected within a specific time-gate, and bn is the normalized
probability for detecting n neutrons.
Y2F =
∑
n n
2bn − (
∑
n nbn)
2 −∑n nbn
2
∑
n nbn
. (3)
6FIG. 4. (Left) pulse shape descriminiation (PSD) metric vs. electron equivalent keV. The red box indicates the region of signals
identified as neutrons. (Right) separation between neutrons and photons in the region just below 5 MeV.
The errors are calculated using the full covariance matrix for a multinomial distribution [58],
σ2Y2F =
1
N
∑
n
bn(1− bn) n
2
4〈n〉4
(
n〈n〉 − 〈n2〉 − 〈n〉2)2
− 1
N
∑
n 6=m
bnbm
nm
4〈n〉4
(
n〈n〉 − 〈n2〉 − 〈n〉2) (m〈n〉 − 〈n2〉 − 〈n〉2) . (4)
The Y2F values and errors for each exposure were calculated separately and checked for outliers before combining
the exposures to calculate a final value and error for each object. The Y2F measurements are listed in Table 2 and
plotted in Fig. 5 along with a set of corrected Y2F values that will be discussed in the next section. We note that
the uncorrected values illustrate the time dependence expected from Eq. 2. One can also see from the uncorrected
beryllium measurements that a significant non-fission component contributes to the uncorrected Y2F values.
gate Be DU HEU diff
(ns) Y2F error Y2F error Y2F error σ
16 1.15E-4 1.70E-6 1.82E-4 4.08E-6 1.98E-4 3.46E-6
corr -3.25E-7 2.23E-6 4.33E-5 2.19E-6 5.05E-5 1.98E-6 2.4
64 2.58E-4 2.88E-6 4.60E-4 6.62E-6 4.98E-4 5.63E-6
corr -2.85E-6 4.44E-6 1.51E-4 4.16E-6 1.78E-4 3.79E-6 4.8
100 2.83E-4 3.31E-6 5.52E-4 7.35E-6 5.95E-4 6.30E-6
corr 9.33E-7 5.59E-6 2.15E-4 5.04E-6 2.45E-4 4.55E-6 4.5
200 2.98E-4 4.19E-6 6.44E-4 8.32E-6 6.95E-4 7.24E-6
corr -5.42E-6 7.87E-6 2.83E-4 6.20E-6 3.20E-4 5.67E-6 4.4
1000 2.54E-4 8.20E-6 7.31E-4 1.15E-5 7.95E-4 1.07E-5
corr -6.65E-5 1.75E-5 3.46E-4 1.00E-5 3.98E-4 9.71E-6 3.7
20000 1.73E-4 3.56E-6 6.87E-4 3.85E-5 8.56E-4 3.85E-5
corr -1.53E-4 7.89E-5 3.00E-4 3.80E-5 4.10E-4 3.83E-5 2.0
TABLE 2. The Y2F results from the beryllium, and 3-plate DU and HEU assemblies. The second row for each time gate,
labeled “corr” gives the value of Y2F after the cross-talk correction is applied.
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FIG. 5. The time-gate dependence of the measured Y2F signals for the beryllium, DU, and HEU 3-disc stacks. Uncorrected
values are plotted as open symbols. The solid symbols show values that have been corrected for cross-talk as explained in
Section IV C.
C. Cross-talk Cuts and Corrections
Neutrons that deposit energy in more than one detector will produce a correlated signal that contributes to the Y2F
term. This effect is shown clearly in Fig. 6. The left panel shows the distribution of pairs of neutron hits for one DU
run as a function of the coincidence time and channel separation for channels in the same array column. Adjacent
channels within a single column are separated by a distance of 18.5 cm. For ∆chan = 1, 90% of these channels are
separated by this distance, with the remaining 10% separated by a distance of 2 meters or greater. ∆chan = 2,
80% are separated by a distance of 37 cm. The corresponding distribution for a GEANT4 [59] simulation is shown
on the the right. The DAQ trigger logic rejects new signals within 256 ns after a given trigger, leaving zero entries
∆chan = 0 row of Fig. 6 creating the empty bins in the top row that is obscured from view. A significant cross-talk
effect is evident in the vertically adjacent and next-nearest neighbor channels (∆chan = 1, 2). These enhancements
are also visible in the GEANT4 simulation shown in the right panel. Additional time-dependent structure in the data
is attributed to the neutron-correlations, which were not included in this simulation.
We have corrected for this cross-talk effect on adjacent channels by fitting the time-dependence to a linear function
at larger times and extrapolating into the cross-talk region, as shown in the left panel of Fig. 7. The fit was performed
for time differences greater than 100 ns, and the integral of the fit was used to calculate the expected signal in the
absence of cross-talk. A similar analysis was performed for next-nearest channels. The ratio of actual counts to
extrapolated counts for adjacent and next-nearest channels is shown in the right panel Fig. 7. Note that for ∆ch = 2
the correction returns to unity for times that are smaller than the transit time between the next-nearest neighbor
channels. Note that this correction was only used for time differences less than 100 ns, and was not used in the
regions above where deviations from unity are dominated by statistical fluctuations. A cross-talk correction was also
calculated for the horizontal neighbors separated by 2 meters (∆ch = 8) and was found to be negligible.
The Y2F values corrected for cross-talk are listed on the second row of each time-gate in Table 2 and plotted
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FIG. 6. (Left) distribution of detected neutron pairs over coincidence time and channel difference for one run of DU data and
(right) a corresponding GEANT4 simulation. Adjacent channels in the same detector-array column are separated by a distance
of 18.5 cm.
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FIG. 7. (Left) the coincidence time distribution for any two pairs of events within a 1 µs time gate, for ∆ch = 1. The peak at
lower values corresponds to cross-talk between neighboring channels. (Right) cross-talk correction factors for ∆ch = 1, 2.
as solid symbols in Fig. 5. Note that the corrected Y2F values for beryllium are consistent with zero as expected.
The difference between Y2F values for the DU and HEU stacked discs, already visible before the application of the
correction, is still easily discernable in Fig. 5. Although the Y2F difference grows larger with increasing time-gate, the
most significant difference for this measurement, approaching 5-sigma, occurs in the region of 50–100 ns. A time-gate
of 100 ns is applied to the analysis of all subsequent measurements.
V. RESULTS AND SIMULATION BENCHMARKS
The Y2F values for 100 ns time-gates and cross-talk corrections for the complete set of objects listed in Table 1
are plotted in Fig. 8 as a function of object multiplication calculated with MCNP. Contrary to expectations based
on Eq. 2, the Y2F values do not depend simply on the multiplication. The Y2F values decrease with multiplication
for the DU discs, remain approximately constant for the HEU disks, and finally exhibit the expected monotonic
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FIG. 8. Measured Y2F for 100 ns time-bins vs. Multiplication for all SNM objects measured at the PSI facility in March, 2013.
Corresponding MCNP calculations are plotted as open squares.
increase for the composite systems. These results are compared to MCNP simulations of the PSI beam incident
on the fissile objects. The detector acceptance was approximated by applying a ±15-degree angular cut above and
below the horizontal. The angular cut matches the angle subtended by the PNPF detector array, and it is required
to account for the polar-angle dependence of the neutron emission rates, which varies with object and is strongest
for the LEU+HEU+HDPE composite objects. A minimum energy cut of 1.5 MeV is also applied to the neutrons
to approximate the online energy cut implemented in the DAQ. Neutrons within this acceptance region were used
to calculated the Y2F in the same manner as the data, using 100 ns time-gates, but without the need for cross-talk
corrections. A geometric efficiency factor of 0.25% was applied to the simulated Y2F values. This value was determined
empirically and is comparable to the 0.243% geometric detector efficiency calculated in GEANT4. The MCNP results
reproduce the overall trends of the data, although the simulations under-predict the decrease for DU and over-predict
the increase for the LEU+HEU composite object. The highest multiplication objects consisting of the interleaved
LEU and HEU objects with HDPE moderation are reasonably well-reproduced by the MCNP simulations.
This complex dependence of the Y2F values that was observed in the data and qualitatively reproduced by the
simulation led us to reconsider some of the assumptions within Eq. 2. One important modification is to account for
the fact that in photon-induced fissions, the initial fission differs from those of subsequent neutron-induced fissions
in the chain. This is analogous to the modification required for spontaneous fission-chains developed by Prasad and
Snyderman [55]. The initial photo-fission is especially important for small multiplication values, where the neutrons
from the initial fission form a non-negligible contribution to Y2F . We introduce νγ for the mean number of neutrons
produced in a photo-fission, and νγ2 for the half-variance. We also account for the non-fission photo-production and
absorption in the extended object by adding the terms fo for the fraction of neutrons emitted from fission over the
total number of neutrons produced by all nuclear reactions and o for the neutron absorption within the object. The
neutron detection efficiency is denoted separately as d. Accounting for these additional factors yields the following
expression for Y2F for photon-induced fissions in an extended object,
Y2F = food
[
νγ2
νγ
+
ν2
ν
(M − 1)
] [
1 +
ν − 1
ν
(M − 1)
]
(5)
The mean number of neutrons per photon-fission, νg has been measured by Caldwell et al. [60] and evaluated by
Chadwick [61], however, the value for νγ2 has not yet been measured. To estimate this value within the simulation, a
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Enrichment ν ν2 νγ νγ2
DU (0%) 2.43 2.45 2.78 3.09
LEU (20%) 2.45 2.52 2.75 3.04
HEU (93%) 2.51 2.63 2.63 2.90
U-235 (100%) 2.52 2.65 2.62 2.86
TABLE 3. First and second combinatorial moments for photon and neutron induced fission for various levels of uranium
enrichment. Neutron induced moments are calculated from Holden and Zucker tables for 1–2 MeV neutrons reported in the
documentation for the MCNP fission package. Photon induced moments are calculated from the photo-fission model using the
PSI beam energy spectrum.
separate simulation of the MCNP photo-fission package was performed using the PSI energy spectrum as input. The
mean and half-variance values for photon-induced fissions obtained in this way are listed in Table 3. We also list the
corresponding values for neutron-induced fissions as reported by Zucker and Holden [62]. To compare our simulations
to Eq. 5, which does not include energy dependence, we remove all energy cuts from the analysis, and we lengthen
the Y2F time-gate for this simulation analysis to 1 ms, to encompass the correlation-time for all neutrons, including
thermal. The values for fo and o were taken from the simulations and a perfect detector efficiency (d = 1) was
assumed. The full comparison between this MCNP simulation and Eq. 5 is shown in Fig. 9. Eq. 5 accounts for the
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FIG. 9. Comparison of Eq. 5 to MCNP simulations of Y2F vs. Multiplication for all SNM objects measured at the Passport
facility. The lines representing Eq. 5 show the impact of a 10% variation in the value of the photo-fission neutron variance, νγ2,
which is currently unmeasured.
full multiplication dependence observed in the simulations, but consistently under-predicts the Y2F values by 20%.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the lack of energy dependent terms in Eq. 5. It is also possible that
our estimate for the unmeasured νγ2 differs from the value used in the full simulation. The Y2F values can be very
sensitive to the value of νγ2 for objects with low multiplication. To illustrate the sensitivity of Y2F to the value of
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Mass (kg) radius (cm) M-DU M-HEU
0.01 0.500 1.016 1.064
0.02 0.630 1.020 1.082
0.05 0.855 1.027 1.115
0.1 1.077 1.033 1.149
0.2 1.357 1.041 1.197
0.5 1.842 1.056 1.289
1 2.321 1.071 1.398
2 2.924 1.088 1.554
5 3.969 1.115 1.941
10 5.000 1.143 2.545
20 6.300 1.173 4.107
50 8.550 1.219 104.1
TABLE 4. Mass, radius, and Multiplication values for DU and HEU spherical objects interrogated with 9-MeV bremsstrahlung
gamma distribution in simulation.
νγ2, we vary its value by ±10%, as shown by the upper and lower bands.
VI. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PREDICTIONS
With the MCNP simulations benchmarked by experimental results and qualitatively supported by an underlying
theory, additional simulations of shorter exposures with larger masses were performed to predict PNPF system perfor-
mance for distinguishing between DU and HEU in shielded configurations. For this study we performed simulations
for a set of 24 solid spheres of DU and HEU spanning a range of masses from 10 grams up to 50 kilograms. The masses,
radii, and multiplication values are given in Table 4. MCNP simulations were performed for these objects using a PSI
beam of 200 µA beam for a 10 second exposure. The emitted neutrons were collected over the entire acceptance and
multiplied by the overall geometric efficiency factor of 0.25% to match the experiment. A lower minimum energy cut
of E>1MeV was used, based upon potential improvements to the neutron identification, and a nominal time-gate of
100 ns was used for calculated Y2F values.
Although the Y2F values are calculated directly from the simulations, we chose to use experimental data to extrap-
olate errors. Fig. 10 shows a uniform, linear dependence in the Y2F error as a function of N
−1/2
counts, independent of
object type. The data are well fit to the following functional form,
σY2F (Ncounts) = 2.43× 10−6 +
0.011√
Ncounts
. (6)
We note that this formula does not extrapolate to zero error for zero counts, consistent with the fact that the errors
are not strictly Poisson-distributed. This scaling is used to rescale our simulations for different objects and shielding
configurations to predict the dependence on exposure time.
Using the simulated Y2F values and errors extrapolated from data, we use a Gaussian classifier to establish Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves for the purpose of distinguishing between HEU and DU objects. Using the
HEU as the alarm scenario and the DU as the null scenario we can assign as “positive” value based on a Gaussian
probability threshold:
P = 1−
∫ ∞
T
dY2F
1√
2piσ
e−(Y
exp−Y2F )2/2σ2 (7)
where Y exp is the measured Y2F and σ is the extrapolated error.
The ROC curves for different unshielded object masses are shown in Fig. 11 for spherical objects of 2, 5, 10, and
20 kg. For every object the ROC values were determined for the current PSI detector configuration (solid lines) and
for one with 4× increased geometric efficiency. The analysis shows that while detection of small objects, e.g. 2kg,
may be difficult, for larger objects the signal becomes large enough for a fast detection. This becomes especially true
for a larger detector array. Note that the positive detection of 20 kg sphere with the 4× augmented detector array
approaches 100% with a very low rate for false positives.
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to obtain the e ciencies, ✏ = 4.13⇥10 4 for HEU and = 5.51⇥10 4 for DU,
in agreement with results shown in Tab. 4.
The various factors for the two experiments were identical, the di↵erence
of the “e ciency” must be due to a discrepancy between the physics package
used by the Monte Carlo and the physics of the data set.
Scaling  Y2F
The scaling of the uncertainty  Y2F is described by Eq. 6. This is shown for
the data in Fig. 5. The fractional uncertainty can also be plotted to be used in
Figure 5: Data for the 300s and full duration runs. Red diamonds are the
HEU points, blue diamonds the DU points. The uncertainty scales with
1/
p
Ncounts independent of the e ciency or Y2F value as expected from Eq. 6.
scaling the Monte Carlo to data. Fig. 6 has the fractional uncertainty plotted
for 1/
p
Ncounts and the linear fits for the DU and HEU samples, separately.
The slopes of the fits to the data points is related to the e ciencies of the
10
FIG. 10. Data for the 300s and full duration runs. Red diamonds are the HEU points, blue diamonds the DU points. The
uncertainty scales with the inverse square root of the total counts.
In addition to characterizi g performance for unshielded objects, the system was also studied for shielded configu-
rations, where the 5 kg objects were surrounded by iron and HDPE blocks of varying thickness. The first shielding
scenario has the primary effect of reducing the incident photon flux, thus reducing statistics in a fixed measurement
time. The second scenario’s impact primarily consists of moderating the fast neutrons, and thus reduces neutron
statistics. Figures 12 shows the ROC curves for the 5 kg object for several thickness of full density iron (left) and
HDPE shielding (right).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of the experimental effort described in this work was to extend the already existing Prompt Neutrons
from Photofission (PNPF) technique, described in Ref. [35], to distinguish between fissionable (e.g. DU) and fissile
(e.g. HEU, WGPu) materials by using neutron multiplicity analysis. The goal of the initial stages of the experimental
program was to develop the necessary statistical and mathematical formalism, the Monte Carlo simulation infrastruc-
ture, and to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of the technique. The results showed a 5-sigma difference in
the signal for the two types of objects, proving the feasibility of this methodology.
The next stages of the program focused on additional experiments, involving more complex target configurations
using DU, LEU, and HEU. The Y2F measurements were compared to simulations, which in turn were used to develop
a theoretical-numerical model providing a basis for extrapolations to larger objects and shorter exposure times. The
results showed that while the Y2F signal is marginal for practical differentiation of the small objects used in the
experiment, for 5kg spherical sizes the neutron multiplication M is large enough to differentiate fissile material types
in shielded cargo configurations with reasonable scan times.
While both the feasibility and practicality of the methodology was demonstrated, significant additional work remains
to be done. Measurements on a wider range of object sizes, both large and small, would be valuable for further
understanding the dynamics of Y2F . Also high statistics measurement of photo-fission neutron distributions with
thin-foil U-235 and U-238 targets with large acceptance detector that would enable precise and accurate determination
of νγ2 would significantly reduce uncertainties for future system performance studies.
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FIG. 11. ROC curves for distinguishing HEU from DU in 10 seconds of 200 µA beam for 2, 5, 10, and 20 kg spherical objects.
Solid lines are for the existing Passport system efficiency, dashed lines show the improvement for a 4× increase in efficiency.
The curve for 20kg object at 4× efficiency is consistent with True Positive Rate = 1.
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